State of Utah v. David Craig Carlsen : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1994
State of Utah v. David Craig Carlsen : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Scott L. Wyatt; attorney for appellee.
David Craig Carlsen; appellant pro se.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, State of Utah v. David Craig Carlsen, No. 940450 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1994).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6106
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plainitff/Appellee, ] 
-vs- ] 
DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN, 
Defendant/Appellant• ] 
» Case No. 940450-CA 
> Case Type: APPEAL 
» Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
AN APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT 
COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF CACHE 
LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT, THE HONORABLE 
ALFRED C. VAN WAGENEN, JUDGE PRESIDING . 
DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN 
P.O. Box 148 
Logan, Utah 84323-0148 
Telephonei (801) 752-8162 
Appellant in Pro Se 
SCOTT L. WYATT 
Logan City Prosecutor 
255 North Main 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 750-9807 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
rrNQ. 'nOW^o 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plainitff/Appellee, 
-vs-
DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
SCOTT L. WYATT 
Logan City Prosecutor 
255 North Main 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 750-9807 
Case No. 940450-CA 
Case Type: APPEAL 
Priority No. 2 
DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN 
P.O. Box 148 
Logan, Utah 84323-0148 
Telephone: (801) 752-8162 
Appellant in Pro Se 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
AN APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT 
COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF CACHE 
LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT, THE HONORABLE 
ALFRED C. VAN WAGENEN, JUDGE PRESIDING 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
Jurisdictional Statement 1 
Statement of Issues Presented 1-3 
Determinative Laws 3 
Statement of the Case: 
Nature of the Case 4 
Course of Proceedings 4-5 
Disposition in Trial Court 5 
Statement of Facts 5-9 
Summary of Argument 9 
Argument: 
Point I: The Written Judgment and Sentence 
Conflicts with the Oral Pronouncement of 
Sentence 9-12 
Point II: The Judgment and Sentence for the 
offense of Simple Assault is an Illegal Sentence 
or a Sentence Imposed in an Illegal Manner . . . 12-17 
Conclusion 17 
Certificate of Mailing 17 
Addendum: 
Information . 19-20 
Judgment, Sentence, (Commitment) 21-22 
Order Denying Motion to Correct Sentence 23-24 
Sentencing Transcript 25-36 
Determinative Laws 36-40 
Motion to Correct Sentence 41-44 
-i-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases Cited: Page 
City of Monticello v. Christensen, 7.88 P.2d 516 (Utah 1990) . . . 2 
State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568 (Utah 1991) 16 
State v. Hyams, 230 P. 349 (Utah 1924) 12 
State v. LeCoure, 491 P.2d 1228 (Mont. 1971) 15 
State v. Lorrah, 761 P.2d 1388 (Utah 1988) 11 
. . . . 14 
. Mccardell, 652 P.2d 942 (Utah 1982) . . . . 
v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 676 (Utah App. 1991) . . . 10 
iman, 667 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1983) 13 
State v 
State 
State v. Musse 
*+.»+.« v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983) I4 
^ . ^ v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991) 2 
Rf.»fce v. Romero, 554 P.2d 215 (Utah 1976) " 
**»+.* v. Sorenson, 639 P.2d 179 (Utah 1981) 15 
*+.»*.* v. Willard, 801 P.2d 189 (Utah App. 1990) . . . . 14 
*+.»*.« v. Workman, 806 P.2d 1198 (Utah App. 1991) 
aff-d, 852 P.2d 981 (Utah 1993) 
Statutes Cited; 
Utah Code Ann. §10-3-914, (1953 as amended) 3 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102, (1953 as amended) 3-16 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4, (1953 as amended) 3-16 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305, (1953 as amended) 3-12 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-4, (1953 as amended) 12 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6, (1953 as amended) 13 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-la-l, (1953 as amended) 3,7 
-ii-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Rules Cited; Page 
Rule 50, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 3/7,16 
Rule 81, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 3,6,16 
Rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 1-16 
Rule 23, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 3,14,16 
Rule 26, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 1 
Constitutional Provisions Cited: 
Article I, § 12, Utah Constitution 3,13-16 
Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution 3,13-16 
Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution . . . . 3,13-16 
-iii-
IN THE UTAH COUHT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ] 
-vs- ] 
DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN, 
Defendant/Appellant. ] 
i Case No. 940450-CA 
> Case Type: APPEAL 
i Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from an Order entered after Judgment 
denying the Defendants Motion to Correct the Sentences imposed 
pursuant to Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
in the First Circuit Court of the State of Utah, County of 
Cache, Logan City Department. This appeal is taken pursuant 
to the provisions of Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure and Utah Code Ann. § 77~18a-l,(1)(b), (1990 Amendment). 
The jurisdiction is invoked upon this Honorable Court to entertain 
this appeal under the provisions of Utah Ann. § 78-2a-3(d), and 
§ 78-4-11, (1953 as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether or not the trial court erred in denying the 
Defendant's Motion to Correct the Sentence because of the con-
flict between the written judgment and the oral pronouncement of 
sentence. 
The standard of review for this Court to review this issue 
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on appeal is that it is a question of law which will be 
reviewed under a correctness standard. City of Monticello 
v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 516 (Utah 1990); State v. Ramirez, 
817 P.2d 774, 781 n.3 (Utah 1991). 
The Defendant preserved this issue for appeal by filing 
a Motion to Correct the Sentence in the trial court in December 
of 1993. A hearing was held on said Motion in the trial court 
on May 10, 1994 and the trial court denied the Defendant's Motion 
to Correct the Sentence by a Written Order signed the Honorable 
Alfred C. Van Wagenen on July 19, 1994. 
2. Whether or not the trial court erred in denying the 
Defendant's Motion to Correct the Sentence because the sentence 
imposed for the offense of Assault was an illegal sentence or 
a sentence imposed in an illegal manner because the trial court 
lack jurisdiction to impose judgment and sentence and was barred 
under the Double Jeopardy Clauses and the Due Process Clauses of 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution 
and Article I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution from imposing any 
judgment and sentence for the offense of Assault. 
The standard of review for this Court to review this issue 
on appeal is that it is a question of law which will be reviewed 
under a correctness standard. City of Monticello v. Christensen, 
supra,; State v. Ramirez, supra. 
The Defendant preserved this issue for appeal by filing 
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a Motion to Correct the Sentence pursuant to Rule 22(e) of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure in the trial court in 
December of 1993. A hearing was held on said Motion in the 
trial court on May 10/ 1994 and the trial court denied the 
Defendant's Motion to Correct the Sentence by a Written Order 
signed by the Honorable Alfred C. Van Wagenen on July 19, 1994. 
DETERMINATIVE LAWS 
The following determinative laws of this case are set 
forth verbatim in the Addendum: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (1953 as amended). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4 (1953 as amended). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305, (1953 as amended). 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-4, (1953 as amended). 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-l-6( 2) (e), (1953 as amended). 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-914, (1990 Amendment). 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-la-l, (1953 as amended). 
Rule 50, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 81, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Rule 23, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution. 
Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution. 
Article I,§ 12, Utah Constitution. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case: 
The Defendant was initially charged by Information in 
the First Circuit Court of the State of Utah, County of Cache, 
Logan City Department, Case No. 911000628 with one count of 
Assault upon a Peace Officer in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-102.4 (1953 as amended), and one count of Interference 
with Arresting Officer in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-
305, (1953 as amended). 
B. Course of Proceedings: 
A jury trial was held in the First Circuit Court on the 
27th day of September, 1991, whereupon the jury returned a 
verdict of guilty to each count charged in the Information. 
The Defendant appeared for sentencing in the trial court 
on November 15, 1991. The trial court prior to imposition of 
sentence, set aside the jury verdict on Count I of the Infor-
mation, the offense of Assault upon a Peace Officer on grounds 
of insufficient evidence adduced at the trial. The trial court 
thereupon found the Defendant guilty of the offense of Assault 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102, (1953 as amended). 
The trial court thereupon imposed sentence for the two offenses 
and fined the Defendant a total of $ 750.00. 
The trial court signed a written Judgment, Sentence (Commit-
ment) which was filed with the Clerk of the Court on November 
26, 1991. Page One of the Judgment, Sentence, (Commitment) 
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shows that the Defendant was convicted and sentenced for one 
count of Simple Assault and one count of Interference with an 
Arrest by Peace Officer. Page two of the written Judgment, 
Sentence, (Commitment) shows that the Defendant was convicted 
and sentenced for the offense of Assault upon a Peace Officer 
and an additional count of Interference with an Arrest by a 
Peace Officer. 
The Defendant in December of 1993, filed a written motion 
pursuant to Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
to Correct the Illegal Sentences imposed by the conflicts between 
the written Judgment and Sentence and the oral pronouncement of 
sentence. Additionally, the Defendant claimed in said Motion 
that the sentence for the offense of Assault was an illegal 
sentence or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner. 
A hearing was held in the trial court on Defendant's Motion 
to Correct the Sentence on May 10, 1994 upon which the trial 
court denied the Defendant's Motion to Correct the Sentence. 
C. Disposition in Trial Court: 
The by a written Order, dated July 19, 1994, denied the 
Defendant's Motion to Correct the Sentences and the written 
Judgment previously signed by the Court. 
D. Statement of Facts: 
The Defendant was lawfully on the property owned by his 
immediate family known as Carlsen's Gas for Less on May 19, 
1991 when he was arrested by former Logan City Police Officer, 
Tim Gil Duron for the offenses of Assault upon a Peace Officer 
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and Interference with an Arrest by a Peace Officer. Tim Gil 
Duron was not scheduled to work for the Logan City Police 
Department on May 19, 1991, but entered the property in a police 
vehicle carrying a firearm and handcuffs. The record shows that 
Gary Bruce Carlsen ordered Mr. Duron to leave such property when 
he appeared in the wash bay and observed Mr. Duron committing a 
crime on the property by strangling the Defendant with a car wash 
wand. (Trial Tr. 223-241). 
An Information was filed in the First Circuit Court of the 
State of Utah, County of Cache, Logan City Department, Case No. 
911000628 charging the Defendant with the offense of Assault 
upon a Peace Officer in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4, 
(1953 as amended) and with the offense of Interference with 
Arresting Officer in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305, 
(1953 as amended). 
A jury trial was held in the First Circuit Court on the 
27th day of September, 1991, whereupon the jury returned a verdict 
of guilty to both counts as charged in the Information. 
The Defendant appeared for sentencing on November 15, 1991, 
and pointing out at Page 4 through Page 6 of the Sentencing 
Transcript, the following proceedings were held in the trial 
court: 
THE COURT: The Court, on its own motion, pursuant to 
Rule 81 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, they apply 
in all criminal cases if no statute or rule conflicts, 
and if there's—in this particular case, the Court knows 
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of no conflicting rule or statute, and so pursuant 
to Rule 50 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, I'm 
going to grant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, 
which in effect will set aside the conviction of the 
Class A misdemeanor, guilty of assault on a peace officer, 
and will find you guilty of a lesser included offense, 
Class B assault. 
I find that essentially, that youfre entitled to 
the ruling and the finding of simple assault as a 
matter of law and I111 give you some reasons for that: 
In other words, I find that essentially there was 
not evidence that would justify the jury in finding that 
Officer Durand was acting within the scope of his authority 
as a peace officer at that time. 
Let me just read this. The Court rules as a matter 
of law that in this case, Officer Durand was not acting 
within the scope of his authority as a peace officer at 
the time he was assaulted by the defendant. The assault 
would therefore be a Class B misdemeanor, simple assault, 
a lesser included offense of Count I. 
There's no question but what the jury found you guilty 
of all of the necessary elements of assault, the Class B 
misdemeanor. One additional element was necessary to 
find you guilty of assault on a peace officer, and that 
was that the individual you assaulted was acting within 
the scope of his authority as a peace officer. And that's 
the only element that I disagree with the jury, and that's 
the basis for this ruling. 
Utah Code Annotated 77-1-a-l states that the duties 
of peace officers consist primarily of the prevention and 
detection of crime and the enforcement of criminal statutes 
and ordinances. The legislature desires that such duties 
not be hindered or interferred with and therefore, had 
increased the penalty imposed if a peace officer is 
assaulted while performing such duties. 
Now, police department rules and regulations may 
require police officers to keep police vehicles washed and 
properly maintained. These rules may also require that an 
officer be neat in his appearance, with a proper hair cut 
and clean uniforms. Such activities may prepare an officer 
so he can perform his law enforcement duties, but they are 
not the type of duties given special consideration and 
protection under the law. 
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If an off-duty peace officer were assulted as he 
sat in the barber's chair, or as he was picking up his 
uniform from the dry cleaners, or as he was washing his 
patrol car, the assault would be the same type of assault 
as would take place on an ordinary citizen who may be 
doing the exact same thing• 
In this case, Officer Durand was simply washing a 
car on this Sunday morning. He was not on duty, not in 
uniform and in no way was seeking to prevent or detect 
crime or enforce any criminal statute or ordinance* 
Under these circumstances, when the defendant 
assaulted Officer Durand, the defendant committed a simple 
assault, a Class B misdemeanor. The Court therefore finds 
the defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of 
assault, a Class B misdemeanor, notwithstanding the verdict 
of the jury in this matter. 
So, there are two charges that you're no convicted 
of, and it's time for sentencing. Count I would be simple 
assault, Count II would be interferring in arrest, both 
Class B misdemeanors. 
Is there anything you'd like to say before I impose 
sentence? 
MR. CARLSEN: No. Other than I believe i'm the one that 
was assaulted during this incident. I—I was required to 
post bail, I had to pay $ 130 medical expenses from being 
strangled. 
The trial court thereafter signed a written Judgment, 
Sentence, (Commitment) which was filed on November 26, 1991. 
Page one of the written Judgment and Sentence states as follows: 
THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT BEING ADJUDGED GUILTY FOR THE 
OFFENSE(S) AS FOLLOWS: 
Charge: 76-5-102 SIMPLE ASLT 
Plea: Not Guilty Find: Guilty - Jury 
Fine: 1075.00 Susp: 700.00 
Jail: 180 DA Susp: 180 DA 
Charge: 76-8-305 INTERF IN ARREST BY P/0 
Plea: Not Guilty Find: ,Guilty - Jury 
Fine: 1075.00 SuspS- 700.00 
Jail: 180 DA Susp: 180 DA 
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Page two of the written Judgment and Sentence states as 
follows: 
Sentence: 
Deft present w/o Counsel/ Prosecutor present 
PRO: SCOTT WYATT 
TAPE 91457 COUNT: 1 
Judge: 
Chrg: ASLT ON P.O. Plea: Not Guilty Find: Guilty - Ju 
Fine Amount: 1075.00 Suspended: 700.00 
Jail: 180 DAYS Suspended: 180 DAYS 
Chrg: INTERF ARREST PO Plea: Not Guilty Find: Guilty - Ju 
Fine Amount: 1075.00 Suspended: 700.00 
Jail: 180 DAYS Suspended: 180 DAYS 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Defendant submits that the trial court erred in denying 
the Defendant's Motion to Correct the Sentence filed pursuant to 
Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure because the 
written Judgment and Sentence conflicts with the oral pronounce-
ment of sentence and the oral sentence prevails. Additionally, 
the Defendant submits that the sentence for the offense of 
Simple Assault in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102/ 
(1953 as amended) is an illegal sentence or a sentence imposed 
in an illegal manner because the trial court lacked jurisdiction 
to impose sentence and the judgment and sentence was barred by 
the Double Jeopardy and Due Process Clauses of the United States 
and Utah Constitution. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE WRITTEN JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE CONFLICTS WITH THE 
ORAL PRONOUNCEMENT OF SENTENCE. 
The Defendant in December of 1993, filed a written Motion 
to Correct the Sentence. A hearing was held on May 10, 1994 
upon which the trial court denied the Defendant's Motion to 
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Correct the Sentence and written Judgment and Sentence, 
The Court in State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 676 at 679 
(Utah App. 1991) observed: 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the "continuing 
jurisdiction of a trial court to correct an illegal 
sentence." State v. Babbel, 813 P.2d 86, 88 (Utah 1991). 
Because an illegal sentence is void, the court does 
not lose jurisdiction over the sentence until that 
sentence has been corrected. Id. The negative im-
plication of this principle is also spelled out in 
Babbel. Once a court imposes a valid sentence, it 
loses subject matter jurisdiction over the case Id. 
(citing State v. Lee Lim, 79 Utah 68, 74, 7 P.2d 825, 
827 (1932). Thus, the district court's jurisdiction 
over the resentencing turns on whether the initial 
sentence was legal. 
A court can correct an illegal sentence at any time. 
Utah R.Crim.P. 22(e) (1991); Babbel, 813 P.2d at 87; 
Lee Lim, 79 Utah 74, 7 P.2d 826-27. 
The written Judgment and Sentence in the instant case shows 
that the Defendant was convicted and sentenced on four different 
misdemeanor offenses, and conflicts with the oral pronouncement 
of sentence. The written Judgment and Sentence shows that the 
Defendant was convicted and sentence for one count of Simple 
Assault; one count of Assault upon a Peace Officer; and two 
counts of Interference with an Arrest by a Peace Officer. The 
transcript of the oral pronouncement of sentence imposed on 
November 15, 1991 shows that the Defendant was sentenced for 
one count of Simple Assault and one count of Interference with 
an Arrest by a Peace Officer. 
Additionally, the written Judgment and Sentence shows that 
the jury found the Defendant guilty for the offense of Simple 
Assault. The transcript of the November 15, 1991 Sentencing 
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shows that it was the Court and not the jury that found the 
Defendant guilty of the offense of Simple Assault. The pro-
ceedings at page 4 of the Sentencing Transcript went as follows: 
"I'm going to grant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict/ which 
in effect will set aside the conviction of the Class A mis-
demeanor, guilty of assault on a peace officer, and will find 
you guilty of a lesser included offense/ Class B assault." Again, 
at page 6 of the transcript the Court stated: "The Court there-
fore finds the defendant guilty of the lesser included offense 
of assault, a Class B misdemeanor/ notwithstanding the verdict 
of the jury in this matter. 
Where there is a direct conflict between an unambiguous 
oral court order and a written order, the oral order controls. 
See, e.g., United States v* Munoz-Dela Rosa, 495 F.2d 253, 256 
(9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Mason, 440 F.2d 1293/ 1299-
1300 (10th Cir. 1971) (the oral sentence prevails where there 
is a variance between the oral and written sentence). 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Lorrah/ 761 P.2d 1388/ 
1389 (Utah 1988) observed: 
The trial court may correct clerical mistakes in 
judgments at any time, with or without notice as the 
court may order. Utah R.Crim.P. 30(b). A clerical 
error, as contradistinguished from judicial error, is 
not "the deliberate result of the exercise of judicial 
reasoning and determination." State v. Mossman, 75 Or. 
App. 385/ 706 P.2d 203/ 204 (1985) (quoting 1 Freeman, 
Judgments § 146/ at 284 (5th ed.)). Clerical errors 
have frequently been corrected by this Court without 
benefit of notice to a defendant. State v. Larson/ 
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758 P.2d 901 (1988); State v. Gerrish, 746 P.2d 762 
(Utah 1987). To ascertain the clerical nature of the 
mistake, this Court will look to the record to harmonize 
the intent of the court with the written judgment. State 
v. Shelby, 728 P.2d 987 (Utah 1986). 
The Defendant respectfully submits that the trial court 
in this case erred in denying the Defendant's Motion to Correct 
the Sentence and the errors in the written judgment. 
POINT II 
THE JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE FOR THE OFFENSE OF SIMPLE 
ASSAULT IS AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE OR A SENTENCE IMPOSED 
IN AN ILLEGAL MANNER. 
The Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in 
denying the Defendant's Motion to Correct the Sentence because 
the sentence imposed for the offense of Simple Assault is an 
illegal sentence or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Hyams, 230 P. 349, 
350 (Utah 1924) observed: 
"The judgment of the court must in all cases be based 
upon the verdict of the jury, and the verdict of the 
jury must be responsive to the issue joined by the in-
dictment or information and the plea of the person on 
trial thereto, otherwise the court is without jurisdiction 
to render judgment thereon." 
The Judgment and Sentence for the offense of Simple Assault 
in the instant case was not based upon the verdict of the jury 
because the verdict of the jury was set aside by the trial court 
on grounds of insufficient evidence adduced at trial. 
The provisions of Utah Code Annotated, § 77-1-4, (1980 
Amendment) provides as follows: 
No person shall be punished for a public offense until 
convicted in a court having jurisdiction. 
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The pertinent part of the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-1-6, (1980 Amendment) provides: 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: 
(2) In addition: 
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of 
a jury, or upon a plea of guilty or no contest, or 
upon a judgment of a court when trial by jury has 
been waived, or, in case of an infraction, upon a 
judgment by a magistrate. 
The Defendant in this case made a written request for a 
jury trial more than ten (10) days prior to the scheduled trial. 
The Defendant has not been convicted by a jury or waived such 
right to a jury trial because the jury verdict was set aside 
by the trial court on grounds of insufficient evidence adduced 
at trial. 
The Defendant further contends that the sentence for the 
offense of Simple Assault was an illegal sentence or a sentence 
imposed in an illegal manner because the trial court setting 
aside the jury verdict for the offense of Assault upon a Peace 
Officer on grounds of insufficient evidence was a factual 
resolution in favor of the Defendant which constituted an 
acquittal, and the trial court was barred by the Double Jeopardy 
and Due Process Clauses of the U.S. and Utah Constitutions from 
entering any judgment or imposing any sentence for the offense 
of simple assault. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 
1061, 1064 (Utah 1983) observed: 
The label attached to a ruling by a trial judge is 
not determinative of whether the termination of a 
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criminal prosecution ia an acquittal. United States 
v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 96-97, 98 S.Ct. 2197, 2196-
2197, 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1980); United States v. Martin 
Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571, 97 S.Ct. 1349, 
1354, 51 L.Ed.2d 642 (1977). A ruling that constitutes 
a factual resolution in favor of the defendant on one 
or more of the elements of the offense charged is an 
acquittal. 
A trial court may arrest a jury verdict when the evidence, 
viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, is so in-
conclusive or so inherently improbable as to an element of 
the crime that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt as to that element. State v. Petree, 659 
P.2d 443 (Utah 1983); State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942 (Utah 
1982); State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah 1976); State v. 
Workman, 806 P.2d 1198 (Utah App. 1991) aff'd, 852 P.2d 
981 (Utah 1993). 
This Court in State v. Willard, 801 P.2d 189 (Utah App. 
1990) held that the trial judge's order suppressing evidence 
and dismissing the case with prejudice constituted an acquittal. 
The trial court prior to imposing sentence at the sentencing 
hearing, ruled that as a matter of law, the evidence adduced at 
trial was insufficient to sustain the Defendant's conviction 
for the offense of Assault upon a Peace Officer as charged in 
the Information and set aside the jury verdict. 
The Defendant respectfully submits that this ruling did 
arrest the jury verdict under Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure and constituted an acquittal. 
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Once a criminal charge has resulted in an acquittal 
by the trier of fact, the prohibition against double joepardy 
prevents that determination from ever again being challenged. 
It is of no consequences that the determination was made as 
a matter of law by a directed verdict of acquittal, or as a 
matter of fact by the trier of fact. Musselman, Id. at 1065. 
The Montana Supreme Court in State v. LeCoure, 158 Mont. 
340, 491 P.2d 1228 (1971) held that defendant who had been 
charged in Federal Court with assaulting an FBI agent engaged 
in performance of his official dutiest>u£ acquitted for failure 
to show that agent was acting in his official capacity when 
assault occurred could not be prosecuted in state court on 
second-degree assault charge arising out of same transaction. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Sorenson, 639 P.2d 
179 (Utah 1981) held that a harsher sentence imposed by the 
trial court in violation of the Due Procees and Double Jeopardy 
Clauses was an illegal sentence. 
The trial court in the instant case was barred under the 
Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States and Utah Constituions 
from entering any judgment or imposing any sentence for the 
offense of Simple Assault and therefore illegal. 
The Defendant also contends that the trial court improperly 
applied Rule 50 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in setting 
aside the jury verdict and entering a judgment of guilt to 
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the offense of assault and imposing sentence thereon. 
The pertinent part of the provisions of Rule 81 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
(e) Application in criminal proceedings. These rules 
of procedures shall also govern in any aspect of criminal 
proceedings where there is no other applicable statute 
or rule, provided that any rule so applied does not 
conflict with any statutory or constitutional require-
ment. 
As previously discussed, it would appear that the trial 
court's application of Rule 50 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure conflicts with numerous statutes and particularly 
the application of Rule 50 conflicts with Rule 23 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the Double Jeopardy Clauses 
of the United States and Utah Constitution. 
Additionally, the trial court reinstated the Defendant's 
conviction and the jury verdict in the written Judgment and 
Sentence were it shows that the Defendant was convicted and 
sentenced for the offense of Assault upon a Peace Officer on 
page two and signed by the trial judge. 
The Defendant being charged with the offense of Assault 
upon a Peace Officer was precluded from defending against the 
offense of Simple Assault and the trial court declined to give 
the jury numerous instructions requested by the Defendant on the 
basis of the Utah Supreme Court decision in State v. Gardiner, 
814 P.2d 568 (Utah 1991) which held that numerous defenses 
are not available to a person charged with the offense of 
-16-
Assault upon a Peace Officer. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant respectfully submits that the trial court 
erred in denying Defendant's Motion to Correct the Sentence 
and the errors in the written Judgment and Sentence. The 
Defendant respectfully submits that this Honorable Court should 
reverse the trial court's Order denying the Defendant's Motion 
to Correct the Sentence and the written Judgment and Sentence, 
and that the matter be remanded to the trial court with in-
structions to correct the sentence and written judgment and 
sentence in full compliance with this Court's decision. 
/ H 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on this£ .day of April, 1995. 
DAVID CRAIG CARLS^ tfJ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellant, postage prepaid to the following 
listed below on this O ^ day of April, 1995: 
Logan City Prosecutor's Office 
Scott L. Wyatt 
255 North Main j-^ 
Logan, Utah 84321 ^f / ' / /& ' s& / 
DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN</ 
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A D D E N D U M 
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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 






t\$ottv dhrii-ic^'x**-' . ,. CO. 
The undersigned Richard Hcndricka under oath states on informacbion 




IN VIOLATION OF: 
CLASSIFICATION: 
AT: 
ON OR ABOUT: 
COUNT 2: 
CRIME: 
IN VIOLATION OF: 
CLASSIFICATION: 
AT: 
ON OR ABOUT: 
Assault on Peace Officer 
Section 76-5-102.4 U.C.A. 1953, as amended, 
Class A Misdemeanor 
Cache County, State of Utah 
May 19, 1991 
Interference with Arresting Officer 
Section 76-8-305 U.C.A. 1953, as amended 
Class B Misdemeanor 
Cache County, State of Utah 
May 19, 1991 
The acts of the defendant(s) constituting the crime(s) were: 
COUNT 1: 
That the said Defendant, on the day and place aforesaid, attempted 
with unlawful force or violence to do bodily injury to another, to 
wit: Gil Duron, a peace officer, with knowledge that said Gil Duron 
was a peace officer and when said peace officer was acting within 
the scope of his authority as a peace officer. 
COUNT 2: 
That the said Defendant, on the day and place aforesaid, having 
knowledge that a peace officer was seeking to effect a lawful 
arrest, did interfere with the arrest by use of force. 
V/caC iv « *•'-/... 
pol 
JUN \ 2 1991 
IV a 
The information is based on evidence obtained from the following 
witnesses: Gil Duron. 





Authorized for presentment 
and filing by the Cache 
County Attorney: 
BY: -fk2iU'&.lK& 4 
Subscribed and sworn to before 
me this * day of 
, 19 9/ . 
CIRCUTF~COURT JUDGE 
^J 
FIRST CIRCUIT COURT - LOGAN c 
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
VS (COMMITMENT) 
CARLSEN, DAVID CRAIG CASE NO: 911000628 
316 S. MAIN DOB: 03/05/49 
LOGAN UT 84321 TAPE: 91457 COUNT: 1 
DATE: 11/15/91 
THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT BEING ADJUDGED GUILTY FOR THE 
OFFENSE(S) AS FOLLOWS: 
Charge: 76-5-102 SIMPLE ASLT 
Plea: Not Guilty Find: tSuilty - Jury 
Fine: 1075.00 Susp: 700.00 
Jail: 180 DA Susp: 180 DA ACS: 0 
Charge: 76-8-305 INTERF IN ARREST BY P/O 
Plea: Not Guilty Find: Guilty - Jury 
Fine: 1075.00 Susp: 700.00 
Jail: 180 DA Susp: 180 DA ACS: 0 
FEES AND ASSESSMENTS: 
Fine Description: FINE,FEE,FORF.-STATE 
Credit: 0.00 Paid: 0.00 Due: 750.00 
TOTAL FINES AND ASSESMENTS: 
Credit: 0.00 Paid: 0.00 Due: 750.00 
PROBATION AGENCIES: 
Agency Name: FIRST CIRCUIT COURT 
Agency Address: 140 NORTH 100 WEST 
Agency Address: 
City/State/Zip: LOGAN UT 84321 
Phone: (801) 752-6893 
PROBATION TERMS & CONDITIONS: 
VIOLATE NO LAWS 
DEF ON INFORMAL COURT PROBATION 
DEF TO PAY FINES @ RATE OF $100/MO BEGIN 12/5 
CALENDAR: 
SENTENCING 11/15/91 01:30 PM in rm 2 with CLINT S JUDKINS 
CARLSEN, DAVID CRAIG CASE NO: 911000628 PAGE 2 
POCKET INFORMATION; 
Sentence: 






PRO: SCOTT WYATT 
91457 COUNT: 1 
ASLT ON P.O. 
Fine Amount: 
Jail: 180 DAYS 
INTERF ARREST PO 
Fine Amount: 
Jail: 180 DAYS 
Plea: Not Guilty Find: 
1075.00 Suspended: 
Suspended: 180 DAYS 
Plea: Not Guilty Find: 
1075.00 Suspended: 
Suspended: 180 DAYS 
Guilty - Ju 
700.00 
Guilty - Ju 
700.00 
BY THE COURT 
NOTE: APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS 
OF ENTRY OF THIS JUDGMENT. 
QC [/fi*. Lik 
DGE/CIRCUIT COURT 
LOG AH O i S T R j n r 
JUL IZ 2 28 Pfl 8S'j 
DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN 
Defendant in Pro Se 
P.O. Box 148 
Logan, Utah 84323-0148 
Telephone: (801) 752-8162 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO CORRECT SENTENCE 
Case No. 911000628 
The above-entitled matter coming on for hearing in this 
Court on the 10th day of May, 1994 on Defendant's Motion to Correct 
the Sentence. The Plaintiff appearing and being represented by 
Logan City Prosecutor, Scott L. Wyatt. The Defendant appearing in 
person and not represented by counsel. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED for good cause appearing that the 
Defendant's Motion to Correct the Sentence and the written Judgment 
previously signed by this Court is hereby denied. 
DATED this 1994. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing proposed ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO CORRECT 
SENTENCE, postage prepaid to the following listed below on this 
12th day of July, 1994: 
Scott L. Wyatt 
Logan City Prosecutor 
255 North Main , * 
Logan, Utah 84321 _^ <Q- / /f /? [/ 



























Case No. 911000628 
SENTENCING 
IN THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT 
-O0o-
CITY OF LOGAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN, 
Defendant. 
-oOo-
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 15th day of November, 
1991, the above-entitled action was held before the 
HONORABLE ALFRED VAN WAGENEN, sitting as Judge in the above-
named Court, and that the following proceedings were had. 
-oOo-
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the City: MR. SCOTT L. WYATT 
Logan City Prosecutor 
255 North Main 
Logan, Utah 84321 
MR. DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN 
Appearing Pro Se 
For the Defendant: 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, C.S.R. 
3241 SOUTH 4840 WEST 
WEST VALLEY CITY, UTAH 84120 
PHONE i 966-4863 
11 p R °S E E D I N G S 
2 
3 I THE COURT; All right. This is the time set for 
4 sentencing. 
5 Before sentencing, is there anything that you'd 
6 like to, Mr, Carlsen, any motions that you'd like to make 
7 I or anything that you'd like to say? 
8 , MR. CARLSEN: Not other than the motion for 








THE COURT: All right. 
As indicated, we talked briefly in chambers as 
indicated, Mr. Wyatt hasn't even seen this motion for arrest 
of judgment, I have glanced over it and considering the 
statutes ar.d whe rules, the case law and so forth, the 
Court, in considering the evidence in this particular 
matter, the Court declines and will deny your motion for an 
17 I arrest of judgment in this matter. 
18 I think you had a motion that you wanted to make, 
19 J Mr. Wyatt. 
MR. WYATT: Yes, your Honor. I'd like to move 
to have my—one of my two exhibits, I believe it was Exhibit 
No. 1, the car wash wand, returned. 





24 do you? 
























goes on appeal, couldn't there be a photograph made of it 
in place of t h e — 
THE COURT: Yeah. Let's make a photograph. 
MR. WYATT: I'm very willing to do that. 
THE COURT: We'll—the Court will order that a 
photograph of the car wash wand be made and replaced and 
put in the place of the exhibit, and that exhibit will be 
returned to you, Mr. Wyatt. 
MR. WYATT: I will send a copy to the defendant so 
that he c a n — 
THE COURT 
12
 I MR. WYATT 
13
 THE COURT 
All right. 
— s e e it. 
As I indicated, as we discussed this 
matter briefly in chambers, the Court has struggled some 
time with regards to the charge of assault on a peace 
officer. 
The jury found that you were in fact guilty of 
Count I, the assault on a peace officer; but I instructed thej 
jury that they could have found you guilty of a lesser 
included offense of assault, just a simple assault o n — 
like would take place on the ordinary citizen. That would 
be a Class B misdemeanor* 
The jury did not find that, but they did find you 




 The Court, on its own motion, pursuant to Rule 
2
 81 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, they apply in all 
3
 I criminal cases if no statute or rule conflicts, and if 
t h e r e 1 s — i n this particular case, the Court knows of no 
5
 I conflicting rule or statute, and so pursuant to Rule 50 of 
6
 the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, I'm going to grant a 
7
 judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which in effect will 
8 set aside the conviction of the Class A misdemeanor, guilty 
9
 of assault on a peace officer, and will find you guilty of a 
10 J lesser included offense, Class B assault. 
I find that essentially, that you're entitled to 
12 I the ruling and the finding of simple assault as a matter of 
13 J law and I'll give you some reasons for that. 
In other words, I find that essentially there was 
not evidence that would justify the jury in finding that 




17 as a peace officer at that time. 
18 
20 
Let me just read this. The Court rules as a 
19 matter of law that in this case, Officer Durand was not 
acting within the scope of his authority as a peace 
21 J officer at the time he was assaulted by the defendant. The 
22 | assault would therefore be $ Class B misdemeanor, simple 
23 I assault, a lesser included offense of the Count I. 
24 There's no question but what the jury found you 
25 guilty of all of the necessary elements of assault, the 
1 Class B misdemeanor. One additional element was necessary 
2 to find you guilty of assault on a peace officer, and that 
3 was that the individual you assaulted was acting within the 
4 scope of his authority as a peace officer, performing his 
6 assigned duties as a peace officer. And that's the only 
6 element that I disagree with the jury, and that's the basis 
7 for this ruling. 
8 Utah Code Annotated 77-1-A-l states that the 
9 J duties of peace officers consist primarily of the prevention 
and detection of crime and the enforcement of criminal 
statutes and ordinances. The legislature desires that such 
duties not be hindered or interferred with and therefore, 
has increased the penalty imposed if a peace officer is 
14 I assaulted while performing such duties. 
15 J Now, police department rules and regulations may 
require police officers to keep police vehicles washed and 
17 I properly maintained. These rules may also require that an 
18 I officer be neat in his appearance, with a proper hair cut 
and clean uniforms. Such activities may prepare an officer 
so he can perform his law enforcement duties, but they are 
not the type of duties given special consideration and 
protection under the law* 
If an off-duty peace officer were assaulted as he 
sat in the barber's chair, or as he was picking up his 












j patrol car, the assault would be the same type of assault as 
would take place on an ordinary citizen who may be doing the 
exact same thing* 
In this case, Officer Durand was simply washing a 
car on this Sunday morning. He was not on duty, not in 
uniform and in no way was seeking to prevent or detect 
crime or enforce any criminal statute or ordinance. 
8
 ( Under these circumstances, when the defendant 
assaulted Officer Durand, the defendant committed a simple 
assault, a Class B misdemeanor. The Court therefore finds 





 J assault, a Class B misdemeanor, notwithstanding the verdict 
13
 l of the jury in this matter 
14 So, there are two charges that you're now 
convicted of, and it's time for sentencing. Count I would 
be simple assault, Count II would be interferring in arrest, 
17
 I both Class B misdemeanors. 
Is there anything you'd like to say before I 
impose sentence? 
MR. CARLSEN: No. Other than I believe I'm the 
one that was assaulted during this incident. I—I was 
required to post bail, I had to pay $130 medical expenses 
23
 | from being strangled. 

















KR. WYATT: No. Nothing, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Kr. Wyatt, you've made a motion 
that I open up the records, you made a motion in objection 
to that. I didn't choose to rule on—either way on that 
motion, so I'm not saying they could be opened. I'm just 
saying this is the way the statute actually is worded, that 
7
 I the Court may open it up. I've chosen not to do that. 
8
 Now, all right. This will be the sentence 
9
 J Mr. Carlsen, on the Count I, the simple assault, and I want 
you to hear this out. The Courtfs going to impose a 
thousand dollar fine and 180 days in jail. I'm going to 
suspend $700 of the fine and all of the jail, on payment of 
a $300 fine and a $75 legislative assessment. And on 
14
 j condition of probation which I'll state. 
15
 I Consecutive with that sentence is the sentence 
1$ I on the interferring in the arrest., the Count II, and on that 
17
 | also, I'm going to impose a thousand dollar fine and 180 
days in jail. I'll suspend $700 of that fine on—and all 
of the jail, on payment of a $300 fine and a $75 legislative 
assessment, and on condition of.probation. 
This is the probation: For one year, you're on 
informal probation to the Court. During that year, there 
23 I are to be no violations of any Federal, State or local law, 
24 j except maybe a minor traffic ticket. If you have a valid 




































light ticket, that would not violate this probation; but any 
DUI# reckless driving, revocation or suspension charge, j 
that would, or certainly any type of evading or anything 
like that. 
Now, as indicated, those sentences run consecu-
tive, so actually, if you violate that probation, you should 
be aware that there could be an additional $1,400 in 
fines and a year in jail, and so I urge and encourage you 
to avoid any type of violation of your probation. 
Now, if my figures are correct, that's a total of 
$750. Do you want to pay that at a hundred a month? 
MR, CARLSEN: Yes. 
THE COURT: When do you want to make your first 
payment? 
MR. CARLSEN: The 1st of December. 
THE COURT: Let's set it up on the 5th of the 
month. Starting the 5th of December and the 5th of each 
month thereafter, you pay $100 or more each month until all 
of the fine and assessments are paid. 
If you donft make the required payment on or before 
the day it's due, you appear in Court on the day it's due at 
9:C0 ofclock to explain why you haven't paid it; otherwise, 
you could be held in contempt for disobeying the order. 
Do you have any questions? 


























THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
MR. CARLSEN: All right* 
(Whereupon, this sentencing hearing was concluded.) 
* * * 
7 
1




I, Tom Frye, do hereby certify that I am a 
5
 I transcriber for Penny C. Abbott, Certified Shorthand 
6
 J Reporter, License No, 93, and Certified Court Transcriber 
of tape recorded court proceedings; that I received the 
8 I electronically recorded tape of the within matter and under 
9
 J her supervision have transcribed the same into typewriting, 
and the foregoing pages, numbered from 1 to 9, inclusive, 
to the best of my ability constitute a full, true and correct] 
transcription, except where it is indicated the tape 
13
 | recorded court proceedings were inaudible. 
14 
15
 DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 11th day of 
16






































C E R T I F I C A T E 
ss, 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE } 
I, PENNY C. ABBOTT, a Certified Shorthand 
Reporter, do hereby certify that I received the 
electronically recorded tape (No, 91-457; in the matter of 
Logan City, plaintiff, vs. David Craig CarIsen, defendant, 
and that I caused it to be transcribed into typewriting, 
and that a full, true, and correct transcription of said 
hearing so recorded and transcribed is set forth in the 
foregoing pages numbered from 1 to 9, inclusive, and that 
said pages constitute an accurate and complete transcriptioiji 
[of all the proceedings adduced at the hearing and contained 
pn the tgipe except where it is indicated that the proceeding 
Has inaudible. 
WITNESS MY HAND and official seal at Salt Lake 
tity, Utah, this 11th day of December, 1991. 
License #93 
My commission expires: 
September 24, 1992 
*ennv C. /Abbot t ,*•> G. S'lTS, * /. 
^mP 
i i 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the 
court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two 
nor more than 30 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court 
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance. 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportu-
nity to make a statement in his own behalf and to present any information in 
mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not 
be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to 
present any information material to the imposition of sentence. 
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in his absence, he 
may likewise be sentenced in his absence. If a defendant fails to appear for 
sentence, a warrant for his arrest may be issued by the court. 
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall 
impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include 
the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of 
sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of his right to appeal and the 
time within which any appeal shall be filed. 
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its 
commitment setting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to 
the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or 
prison and shall make his return on the commitment and file it with the court. 
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an 
illegal manner, at any time. 
Cross-References. — Pre-sentence investi-
gation, § 76-5-404. 
Rules of evi<i
€nCe inapplicable to sentencing 
and probation proceedings. Rule 1101, U.RE. 
Suspending imposition of sentence and plac-
ing defendant on probation, § 77-18-1. 
Rule 23 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 352 
Rule 23. Arrest of judgment. 
At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, the court upon its own 
initiative may, or upon motion of a defendant shall, arrest judgment if the 
facts proved or admitted do not constitute a public offense, or the defendant is 
mentally ill, or there is other good cause for the arrest of judgment. Upon 
arresting judgment the court may, unless a judgment of acquittal of the of-
fense charged is entered or jeopardy has attached, order a commitment until 
the defendant is charged anew or retried, or may enter any other order as may 
be just and proper under the circumstances. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 





Variance between charge and verdict. 
Cited. 
Challenge to jurisdiction. 
Jurisdictional question was properly raised 
by motion in arrest of judgment. State v. Mer-
ritt, 67 Utah 325, 247 P. 497 (1926). 
Grounds. 
A judgment may be arrested based on an in-
sufficiency of the evidence or facts as proved in 
trial or as admitted by the parties. State v^ 
Workman, 806 P.2d 1198 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), 
affd, 852 P.2d 981 (Utah 1993). 
An arrest of judgment is appropriate where 
the verdict is based on inherently improbable 
evidence. State v. Workman, 806 P.2d 1198 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991), affd, 852 P.2d 981 (Utah 
1993). 
Mental illness. 
grounds for a new trial, not an arrest of judg-
ment, even though defendant's motion for ar-
rest of judgment or in the alternative for a new 
trial was made before imposition of sentence. 
State v. Owens, 753 P.2d 976 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). 
Standard. 
A trial court may arrest a jury verdict when 
the evidence, viewed in the light most favor-
able to the verdict, is so inconclusive or so in-
herently improbable as to an element of the 
crime that reasonable minds must have enter-
tained a reasonable doubt as to that element. 
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983); 
State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942 (Utah 1982); 
State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah 1976); 
State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981 (Utah 1993). 
Variance between charge and verdict 
Although the verdict form signed by the jury 
foreman stated that the defendant was guilty 
of "forcible sexual assault" and the information 
had charged the defendant with "aggravated 
sexual assault," the variance did not justify the 
granting of a motion to arrest judgment on the 





- - - -—.««. «« tV»o iiiT-w vArHirt form does 
243 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 81 
Opening default or default judgment claimed 
to have been obtained because of attorney's 
mistake as to time or place of appearance, 
trial, or filing of necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d 
1255. 
Validity and construction of constitution or 
statute authorizing exclusion of public in sex 
offense cases, 39 A.L.R.3d 852. 
Right of accused to have press or other media 
representatives excluded from criminal trial, 
49 A.L.R.3d 1007. 
Rules 78 to 80. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Rule 78, relating to motion day, 
Rule 79, relating to books and records kept by 
the clerk, and Rule 80, relating to reporters 
Power of court to impose standard of per-
sonal appearance or attire, 73 A.L.R.3d 353. 
What amounts to "appearance" under stat-
ute or rule requiring notice, to party who has 
"appeared," of intention to take default judg-
ment, 73 A.L.R.3d 1250. 
Applicability of judicial immunity to acts of 
clerk of court under state law, 34 A.L.R.4th 
1186. 
Key Numbers. — Clerks of Courts «= 24, 66; 
Courts «=> 61 et seq.; Judgment <s= 276; Motions 
«=» 57; Trial <s=> 5, 20. 
and record transcripts, were repealed by order 
of the Supreme Court, effective May 1, 1991. 
PART XI. 
GENERAL PROVISIONS. 
Rule 81. Applicability of rules in general. 
(a) Special statutory proceedings. These rules shall apply to all special 
statutory proceedings, except insofar as such rules are by their nature clearly 
inapplicable. Where a statute provides for procedure by reference to any part 
of the former Code of Civil Procedure, such procedure shall be in accordance 
with these rules. 
(b) Probate and guardianship. These rules shall not apply to proceedings 
in uncontested probate and guardianship matters, but shall apply to all pro-
ceedings subsequent to the joinder of issue therein, including the enforcement 
of any judgment or order entered. 
(c) Procedure in city courts and justice courts. These rules shall apply 
to civil actions commenced in the city or justice courts, except insofar as such 
rules are by their nature clearly inapplicable to such courts or proceedings 
therein. 
(d) On appeal from or review of a ruling or order of an administra-
tive board or agency. These rules shall apply to the practice and procedure 
in appealing from or obtaining a review of any order, ruling or other action of 
an administrative board or agency, except insofar as the specific statutory 
procedure in connection with any such appeal or review is in conflict or incon-
sistent with these rules. 
(e) Application in criminal proceedings. These rules of procedure shall 
also govern in any aspect of criminal proceedings where there is no other 
applicable statute or rule, provided, that any rule so applied does not conflict 
with any statutory or constitutional requirement. 
City courts. — Former § 78-4-32, as en-
acted by L. 1977, ch. 77, § 1, transferred the 
jurisdiction and powers of the city courts to the 
municipal departments of the circuit courts. 
For circuit court jurisdiction generally, see Ti-
tle 78, Chapter 4. 
Cross-References. — Administrative Rule-
making Act, § 63-46a-l et seq. 
Circuit courts generally, § 78-4-1 et seq. 
Justice courts generally, § 78-5-101 et seq. 
Uniform Probate Code, Title 75. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Administrative proceedings. 
City and justices' courts. 
Criminal proceedings. 
Special statutory proceedings. 
Cited. 
Administrative proceedings. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are inap-
plicable to a proceeding before an administra-
tive body seeking to regulate activities bur-
dened with a public interest. Entre Nous Club 
v. Toronto, 4 Utah 2d 98, 287 P.2d 670 (1955). 
Rule 6(e) is not inconsistent with, nor clearly 
inapplicable to, the procedure of the Industrial 
Commission and therefore supplements the 
procedure of the Commission. Griffith v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 16 Utah 2d 264, 399 P.2d 204 
(1965). 
Where road commission's order that sign be 
ale 50- Motion for a directed verdict ana IUI juu & «.— 
notwithstanding the verdict. 
(a) Motion for directed verdict; when made; effect. A party who moves 
r a directed verdict at the close of the evidence offered by an opponent may 
fer evidence in the event that the motion is not granted, without having 
served the right so to do and to the same extent as if the motion had not 
sen made. A motion for a directed verdict which is not granted is not a 
aiver of trial by jury even though all parties to the action have moved for 
Lrected verdicts. A motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific 
round(s) therefor. The order of the court granting a motion for a directed 
erdict is effective without any assent of the jury. 
(b) Motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Whenever a mo-
ion for a directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence is denied or for 
my reason is not granted, the court is deemed to have submitted the action to 
he jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the 
notion. Not later than ten days after entry of judgment, a party who has 
noved for a directed verdict may move to have the verdict and any judgment 
entered thereon set aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with his 
motion for a directed verdict; or if a verdict was not returned such party, 
within ten days after the jury has been discharged, may move for judgment in 
accordance with his motion for a directed verdict. A motion for a new trial 
may be joined with this motion, or a new trial may be prayed for in the 
alternative. If a verdict was returned the court may allow the judgment to 
stand or may reopen the judgment and either order a new trial or direct the 
entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed. If no verdict 
was returned the court may direct the entry of judgment as if the requested 
verdict had been directed or may order a new trial. 
(c) Same: Conditional rulings on grant of motion. 
(1) If the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, provided 
for in Subdivision (b) of this rule, is granted, the court shall also rule on 
tVip motion for a new trial, if any, by determining whether it should be 
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motion for a new trial is thus conditionally granted, the order thereon 
does not affect the finality of the judgment. In case the motion for a new 
trial has been conditionally granted and the judgment is reversed on 
appeal, the new trial shall proceed unless the appellate court has other-
wise ordered. In case the motion for a new trial has been conditionally 
denied, the respondent on appeal may assert error in that denial; and if 
the judgment is reversed on appeal, subsequent proceedings shall be in 
accordance with the order of the appellate court. 
(2) The party whose verdict has been set aside on motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict may serve a motion for a new trial pursuant 
to Rule 59 not later than ten days after entry of the judgment notwith-
standing the verdict, 
(d) Same: Denial of motion. If the motion for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict is denied, the party who prevailed on that motion may, as respon-
dent, assert grounds entitling him to a new trial in the event the appellate 
court concludes that the trial court erred in denying the motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. If the appellate court reverses the judgment, 
nothing in this rule precludes it from determining that the respondent is 
entitled to a new trial, or from directing the trial court to determine whether a 
new trial shall be granted. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 50, F.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS the losing party, the directed verdict cannot be 
Directed verdict sustained. Management Comm. of Graystone 
T general ^*ne Homeowners Ass'n ex rel. Owners of Con-
Anneal dominiums v. Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 
——After failure to seek. 8 9 6 ( U t a h 1982 )-
Nunc
 p r o tunc ^
n e
 Supreme Court will sustain the grant-
Evidence. m& °^ a m o t i ° n f°r a directed verdict only if the 
evidence was such that reasonable men could 
(1) (a) "Feace omcer means any employee ui a ww ciuui^iuw^ ~&™*y. 
is part of or administered by the state or any of its political subdivisions 
and whose duties consist primarily of the prevention and detection of 
crime and the enforcement of criminal statutes or ordinances of this state 
or any of its political subdivisions, 
(b) "Peace officer" specifically includes the following: 
(i) any sheriff or deputy sheriff, police officer, or marshal of any 
county, city, or town; 
(ii) the commissioner of public safety and any member ot the 
Department of Public Safety certified as a peace officer; 
(iii) all persons specified in Section 23-20-1.5; 
(iv) any police officer employed by any college or university; 
(v) investigators for the Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division; 
(vi) special agents or investigators for the attorney general, district 
attorneys, and county attorneys;
 m 
(vii) employees of the Department of Natural Resources designated 
as peace officers by law; and 
(viii) school district police officers as designated by the board ot 
education for the school district; 
(ix) the executive director of the Department of Corrections and 
any correctional enforcement or investigative officer designated by the 
executive director and approved by the commissioner of public safety 
and certified by the Peace Officers Standards and Training Division; 
(x) members of a law enforcement agency established by a private 
college or university provided that the college or university has been 
certified by the commissioner of public safety according to rules of the 
Department of Public Safety. , . . * * , _ *u •*, 
(2) Peace officers have statewide peace officer authority, but the authority 
extends to other counties, cities, or towns only when they are acting under 
Title 77 Chapter 9, Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit. This limitation does not 
apply to'any peace officer employed by the state. The authority of peace officers 
employed by the Department of Corrections is regulated by Title 64, Chapter 
13, Department of Corrections — State Prison. 
10-3-914. Police officers — Authority. 
(1) Within the boundaries of the municipality, police officers have the same 
authority as deputy sheriffs, including at all times the authority to preserve 
the public peace, prevent crime, detect and arrest offenders, suppress riots, 
protect persons and property, remove nuisances existing in the public streets, 
roads, and highways, enforce every law relating to the suppression of offenses, 
and perform all duties required of them by ordinance or resolution. 
(2) This section is not a limitation of a police officer's statewide authority as 
otherwise provided by law. 
History: C. 1953, 10-3-914, enacted by L. same powers and responsibilities as consta-
1977, ch. 48, § 3; 1990, ch. 44, § 2. bles" and "including at all times the authority" 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend- for wIt shall be the duty of the police force in 
ment, effective April 23, 1990, designated the any municipality at all times," and made a 
previously undesignated language as Subsec-
 m i n o r p U n c t u a t i o n change, 
ion 1 ; added Subsection (2); and, in Subsec- Cross-References. - Duties of special DO-
tion (1), combined together the former two sen- i:„^
 0 „ ™ : „ * ^ u„ „ M t A s an io A 
tences, substituted W i t h i n the boundaries of l l C£ ****** b J * o v e ™ r > 67-12-4. 
the municipality, police officers have the same £ e a < * ° £ , C e r f s ^ a t " > n > * J J ' 1 *" 1 e t ***• 
authority as deputy sheriffs" for "The police £ e a c e o f ! l c e r ^ ^ § f-15"1 e t * * -
officers of any municipality shall have the P o w e r s o f «**aMes f § 17-25-1. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS licemen were not to be regarded merely as 
agents or servants of municipality, but rather 
Classification of office of policeman. as public or state officers. Everill v. Swan, 17 
Trespass by officers. Utah 514, 55 P. 68 (1898). 
Classification of office of pol iceman. T re spas s by officers. 
For the purpose of a former statute providing If power conferred upon officer by this see-
that appointed officers in cities and towns tion is not regularly pursued, officer is guilty of 
should hold their respective offices until their a trespass. Roe v. Lundstrom, 89 Utah 520, 57 
successors were appointed and qualified, po- P.2d 1128 (1926). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
(1) Assault is: 
anotii^ a t t e m p t ' ^ l a w f u l force or violence, to do bodily injury to 
(b) a threat accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do 
bodily injury to another; or 
clCLT act> ^ ^ ^ t e d ^ t h unlawful force or violence, that causes or 
creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another (2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
1 9 ? i 9 S ^ 2 C i S K S ^ 8 ? Y ^ ^ A — * » « * Not - . - The 1991 amend-75 | 3 38,1989, ch. 51, J 1; 1991, eh. ment, effective April 29, 1991, inserted 'or 
Repeal* and R e v e t m e n t s . - Laws %£? " S U b s t a D t i a l ™k of" m S u b s e c t i o n 
1974, ch. 32, § 38 repealed former § 76-5-102 Cross-Referpn^x n.„ »,-• i.-
relating to assault, and enacted present § 76- Power of city to prohibit a s L l t L battery. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
76-5-102.4. Assault against peace officer. 
Any person who assaults a peace officer, with knowledge that he is a peace 
officer, and when the peace officer is acting within the scope of his authority as 
a peace officer, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
History: G.1953,76-5-102.4, enacted by L. Peace officers. Title 77, Chapter la. 
1974, ch. 32, $ 32; 1987, ch. 23, § 1. 
Cross-References. — Assault on conserva-
tion officer, § 23-20-26. 
76-8-305. Interference with arresting officer. 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or by the 
exercise of reasonable care should have knowledge, that a peace officer is 
seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of that person or another and 
interferes with the arrest or detention by: 
(1) use of force or any weapon; 
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act required by lawful 
order: 
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and 
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or detention; or 
(3) ""the arrested person's or another person's refusal to refrain from 
performing any act that would impede the arrest or detention. 
History: C. 1953, 76-8-305, enacted by L. as enacted by § 76-8-305, relating to interfer-
1981, ch. 62, § 1; 1990, ch. 274, § 1. ence with law enforcement official seeking to 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws detain interferor or another, and enacted 
1981, ch. 62, § 1 repealed former § 76-8-305, present § 76-8-305. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS and subsequent interference with arrest by 
. fellow student was not resistance or obstruction 
Constitutionality.
 o f o f f i c e r m d i s c h a r g e o f du ty> S t a t e e x rel 
Pe^cVofi^re Hurley, 28 Utah 2d 248, 501 P.2d 111 (1972). 
Unlawful search of premises. Peace officers. 
Cited. Game wardens were by law peace officers 
Constitutionality. w ^° ^a^ s a m e power and followed same proce-
Former § 76-8-305 (L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-8- d u r e » making arrests as other peace officers. 
305), which made it unlawful to interfere inten- State v. Sandman, 4 Utah 2d 69, 286 P.2d 1060 
tionally with recognized law enforcement offi- (1955). 
cial seeking to detain interferor or another,
 TT , __e_ , , -
regardless of whether there was legal basis for Unlawful search of premises. 
arrest, was unconstitutionally vague. State v. Defendants convictions of assaulting a peace 
Bradshaw, 541 P.2d 800 (Utah 1975). o f f i c e r a n d interfering with a peace officer were 
affirmed, where the officer was acting within 
Lawful arrest. the scope of his authority in responding to a 
University security officer who arrested stu- complaint regarding a party where minors 
dent in area where sole interests of university were consuming alcohol, even though his at-
were location of fraternity and religious insti- tempted search of the premises was later found 
tute for students was not discharging, or at- to be unlawful. State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568 
- . :— ^ J:_T « „„„
 A„tv nf h-e n f i F W aitah 1991>. 
77-1-4. Conviction to precede punishment. 
No person shall be punished for a public oflfense until convicted in a court 
having jurisdiction. 
ffistory: C. 1953, 77-1-4, enacted by L. prived of life or liberty without due process of 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. law. Utah Const,, Art. I, § 7. 
Cross-References, — No person to oe de-
77-1-6 UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
COLLATERAL REI^RENCES 
CJUS. — 22 CJ.S. Criminal Law >j 21. 
77-1-6, Rights of defendant. 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: 
(a) lb appear in person and defend in person or by counsel; 
(b) lb receive a copy of the accusation filed against him; 
(c) lb testify in his own behalf; 
(d) lb be confronted by the witnesses against him; 
(e) lb have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses in 
his behalf; 
(0 lb a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district 
where the offense is alleged to have been committed; 
(g) lb the right of appeal in all cases; and 
(h) lb be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of law, or be 
entitled to a trial within 30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail 
and if the business of the court permits. 
(2) In addition: 
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense; 
(b) No accused person shall, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or 
the laws of Utah, or to pay the costs of those rights when received; 
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself; 
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband nor a 
husband against his wife; and 
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon a 
plea of guilty or no contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial by 
jury has been waived or, in case of an infraction, upon a judgment by a 
magistrate. 
History: C 1953, 77-1-5, enacted by L. Husband or wife not competent witness 
1980, ch. 15, § 2, against or for each other without consent, ex-
Cirtss-References. — Attorneys, rights in ceptions, { 78-24-8. 
disbarment proceedings, § 78-51-16.
 J u r y ^ j a n d w a i v e r thereof, Utah Const, 
Constitutional rights of accused, Utah Art. I, § 10; Rule 17, UitCr.P. 
Const. Art L § 12.
 t nn oty ^ A Lineup p i ^ u r e s ' , } 77-8-1 et seq. Counsel for indigents, § 77-32-1 et seq. w u- i J J J ui - _J 
Discharge of defendant turned stated wit- . ^ultipte Prosecutions and double jeopardy, 
ness, § 77-17-2. § l6 ;1"4 0 1 e t *?*
 A . . 
Dismissal without trial, Rule 25, U.R.Cr.R „ Ordinance violation cases, jeopardy in, § 10-
Due process of law, Utah Const, Art I, § 7. ' "^5-
Errors and defects not affecting substantial Subpoena for witnesses for impecunious de-
rights disregarded, Rule 30, U.R.Cr.P. fendant in criminal case, § 21-5-14. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS —Testimony at former trial. 
Appearance at trial in prison clothing. -Testimony at preliminary hearing. 
-Waiver of right. ^ o f accusation. 
Confrontation of witness. —Bill of particulars. 
—Depositions. Double j'eopardy. 
—Retrial Drooer. 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons,] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
AMENDMENT V [1791] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless f on|aj 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or inMth^  
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject foljtnl? 
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case^ to'li>ej 
a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,~liberty, or property, without due process of law^fnor] 
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
n 
~ ™ ~ ~ • . ' • , • . • - • • - — = • — • — — _ _ _ ? h 
AMENDMENT XIV [1868] 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.. No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of .life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to 
any person.within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Section-2.r^'Representatives -shall be apportioned among the several States according to their 
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State excluding Indians not taxed. 
But when the right to vote at any election for:^e choice of electors for President and Vice President of 
the United States, Representatives in Congress," the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the 
members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to;any of the male inhabitants of such State, being 
twenty-one years of age, and .citizens of ,* the ^ United States, or in any way abridged, except for 
participation,in rebellion,; or£otner;crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the 
proportion^which the nuinberTofpsuch male "citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
twenty-one years of age in such Stater 
Section 3.^No person shaH be^a*^ Congress, of electbrof President'and 
Vice Presiden^or hold anyjoffice^civil o r j n ^ t a i y ^ States, or under any State, who 
having previously taken Juibath^^ arias a 
member of.any,State^legislatoe^r,as^^^ officer of ^anyj&a^rto^suppo^^he 
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Kreitel from denial of summary judgment 
in a personal injury case. 
One Steve J. Liss filed a personal injury 
action against defendants George Kreitel, 
John Doe No. 1 and John Doe No. 2 seek-
ing damages for personal injuries suffered 
in an accident while plaintiff was drilling 
a water well on petitioner's land in Carter 
County, Montana. The action was filed in 
the district court of the sixteenth judicial 
district of the State of Montana, Carter 
County, before the Honorable Alfred B. 
Coate, District Judge. Answer was filed 
and depositions were taken from plaintiff, 
his wife and the three defendants. There-
after defendants moved for a summary 
judgment on the basis that their affirma-
tive defense of assumption of risk was es-
tablished as a matter of law. Judge Coate 
denied defendants' motion for summary 
judgment. 
Following the ex parte presentation and 
filing of the writ for supervisory control 
herein by defendants below, this Court is-
sued its order to show cause and heard ar-
gument from counsel for both parties, 
thereafter taking the matter under advise-
ment. 
Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P. provides a stand-
ard for determining if summary judgment 
should be granted in this language: 
«* * * The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, dep-
ositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. * * * " 
A succinct statement of the controlling 
principle under this rule is found at 3 Bar-
ron & Holtzoff—Federal Practice and Pro-
cedure, Sec. 1234, p. 122: 
'The question to be decided on a mo-
tion for summary judgment is whether 
there is a genuine issue of fact and not 
how that issue should be determined. 
The hearing on the motion is not a trial. 
* * *» 
Also see Duchesneau et al. v. Silver Bow 
County et al. v. Mack Trucks, Inc. et al., 
28 St.Rep. 732. 
In the instant case there are several is-
sues of material fact requiring submission 
to a jury for their determination and these 
issues cannot be determined as a matter of 
law. The existence or nonexistence of a 
valid defense of assumption of risk de-
pends upon establishing certain facts upon 
which said defense is predicated. These 
facts have not been established as a matter 
of law. 
Accordingly the petition for supervisory 
control is denied and the petition dis-
missed. 
O | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM, 
The STATE of Montana, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Kenneth A. LeCOURE, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No. 12087. 
Supreme Court of Montana. 
Submitted Dec. 1, 1971. 
Decided Dec. 20, 1971. 
The Second Judicial District Court, 
Silver Bow County, John B. McClernan, J.t 
entered order granting defense motion to 
dismiss a second-degree assault informa-
tion on ground that defendant had already 
been placed in jeopardy in federal court, 
and State appealed. The Supreme Court, 
John C. Harrison, } . , Yield that deiendant 
who had been charged in federal court 
with assaulting an FBI agent engaged in 
performance of his official duties but ac-
quitted for failure to show that agent was 
acting in his official capacity when assault 
STATE v. 
Cite as 491 
could not be prosecuted in state 
second-degree assault charge aris-
f same transaction. 
rmed. 
Law <§=>20l 
mdant who had been charged in 
:ourt with assaulting an FBI agent 
in performance of his official du-
acquitted for failure to show that 
as acting in his official capacity 
sault occurred could not be prose-
state court on second-degree as-
arge arising out of same transac-
;U.S.C.A.§§ 111,1114. 
t L. Woodahl, Atty. Gen., J. C. 
rtner, Deputy Atty. Gen., argued, 
Lawrence G. Stimatz, County 
f. Brian Tierney, Deputy County 
.rgued, Butte, for plaintiff and ap-
md, Holland & Haxby, David L. 
I, argued, Butte, for defendant and 
lent. 
N C. HARRISON, Justice. 
appeal arises from an order grant-
lotion to dismiss a second degree as-
nformation, on the grounds defend-
i been "once in jeopardy". 
facts giving rise to the case are : 
[. Bassett, a Federal Bureau of In-
ition (FBI) agent assigned to the 
office, on September 13, 1969, upon 
I in Butte from a trip to Bozeman, 
is government vehicle to the govern-
^arage. He picked up his own vehi-
d proceeded to the local FBI office 
n in some equipment and sign out. 
irked his vehicle in a reserved area 
ihortly thereafter defendant backed 
ckup into the front of Bassett's vehi-
msing considerable damage. Defend-
id not stop after the accident How-
due to a stop sign at an intersection 
LeCOURE Mont. J229 
P.2d 1228 
he stopped and Bassett, who had followed 
defendant's car on foot in an attempt to 
get the license number of the vehicle which 
had damaged his vehicle, was confronted 
by defendant. Defendant struck Bassett 
causing him to be hospitalized for frac-
tures of the cheek bone and for dental sur-
gery. 
Thereafter an agent of the FBI, one Hal 
Vogalsang, contacted Mark Sullivan, the 
county attorney of Silver Bow County, in 
regard to filing charges in the state court 
on the alleged assault. He later informed 
Mr. Sullivan that a decision had been made 
to prosecute the defendant in the federal 
court, rather than in the state court. The 
matter was submitted to a federal grand 
jury which issued the following true bill: 
'That on or about the 13th day of Sep-
tember, 1969, at Butte, in the State and 
District of Montana, KENNETH AL-
BERT LeCOURE did forcibly assault 
Fred J. Bassett by striking said Fred J. 
Bassett with his fist or other object, the 
said Fred J. Bassett then and there being 
an agent of the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation, a person designated in Sec-
tion 1114 of Title 18, United States 
Code, engaged in and on account of the 
performance of his official duties. Said 
assault in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§111 
and 1114." 
The case went to trial before Judge 
Murray, sitting with a jury, on May 25, 
1970. After the jury had been empaneled 
and the government had completed its case 
and rested, the defendant through counsel 
moved the court for judgment of acquittal. 
On May 26, 1970, Judge Murray granted 
the motion and stated to the jury: 
"COURT Ladies and gentlemen of the 
jury, yesterday at the close of the gov-
ernment's case, the defense made a mo-
tion for acquittal on the grounds and for 
the reasons that the Government had 
failed to prove the charge made. As you 
understand, this is a Federal case and in 
order for the government to prove its 
case, it must prove that the person as-
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saulted, Mr. Bassett, was at the time of 
the assault engaged in or on account of 
the performance, he was assaulted while 
he was engaged in or on account of the 
performance of his official duties. 
"Now, the testimony was that Mr. 
Bassett went to the truck of the defend-
ant for the purpose of getting a name 
and license number in order to have the 
information in the event his own truck 
had been damaged. Now, that had noth-
ing to do with his official duties, and as 
a result of that, no federal law has been 
violated. 
"It is unfortunate, of course, that at 
this point we cannot proceed further, but 
there's no sense in proceeding further, to 
receive the testimony of the defense; of 
course, as of this time and under the 
state of the evidence as it now exists, 
there certainly exists cause for the State 
to bring an action against the defendant 
for assault, just as any individual may 
be subjected to assault when he strikes 
any other citizen or any other individual. 
"So while we are not at liberty to 
guess the guilt of the defendant, because 
he hasn't had an opportunity to present 
his evidence, still the matter should be 
presented in my opinion, to a jury in a 
proper case and for the jury to deter-
mine as to the guilt or innocence of the 
defendant herein involved. 
"So as I say because from the evi-
dence it is clear that Mr. Bassett was 
acting not in the performance of his of-
ficial duties, but for his own benefit to 
get—to protect his own property, so to 
speak, just to get the name and license 
number so that in the event his vehicle 
—he didn't even know, apparently, at 
that point whether his truck had been 
damaged, or his car, but in any event he 
wanted to get that information for the 
purpose of just having it in order to 
maybe recover in the event his car had 
been damaged. 
"So judgment—the motion for judg-
ment of acquittal is granted, and you la-
dies and gentlemen I thank you for hav-
ing served as jurors to this extent." 
On May 27, 1970, judgment of acquittal 
was entered. 
Eleven months later, on April 27, 197j 
an Information charging defendant with a 
felony, towit—assault in the second degree 
was filed in Silver Bow County. Defend-
ant did not enter a plea, but submitted to 
the court a motion to dismiss on the 
grounds that "prosecution is barred under 
the laws of the State of Montana and of 
the Constitutions of the United States and 
the State of Montana." After a hearing 
on the motion and the matter briefed for 
the trial court by both parties, the motion 
to dismiss was granted. 
The only issue before this Court is 
whether the disposition of the case by the 
federal court bars the state from filing 
similar charges in the state court. 
Under the fact situation here, the answer 
must be in the affirmative. The state in 
its argument refers to the disposition of 
the case in the federal court as a dismissal. 
The record in the federal courts shows a 
judgment of acquittal. The state would 
have this Court take the position that the 
reason the case was filed in the state court 
is that the federal court lacked jurisdiction. 
The record in the federal court is to the 
contrary. Here, an indictment was re-
turned in the federal district court; de-
fendant was arrested; he appeared and en-
tered a plea of not guilty. At this point 
the question of jurisdiction did not arise 
for obviously the federal court did feel it 
had jurisdiction. 
What the United States district attor-
ney's office failed to prove was that Bas-
sett was acting in his official capacity 
when the assault occurred; that failure, 
not, as it argues here, a failure of jurisdic-
tion, was fatal. Defendant was in jeop-
ardy and nothing can breathe new life into 
a criminal action against him in the state 
courts. 
Here, in the federal court defendant was 
charged with assaulting Fred J. Bassett, an 
agent of the FBI, engaged in and on ac-
STATE v. 
Cite as 491 
it of the performance of his official 
»s. The charge in the state court was 
ond degree assault". The difference in 
wording of the two charging docu-
ts does not change the fact that the 
ge arose out of the "same transaction", 
e v. McDonald, Mont., 491 P.2d 711. 
hose who had to make the decision into 
:h court or jurisdiction they would 
g the case had a choice—state or fed-
Having elected to proceed in the 
LeCOURE Mont. 1231 
P.2d 1228 
federal court, whatever the motive, and the 
defendant having been acquitted there, 
they can not now have another try—at the 
expense of defendant. 
The decision of the trial court is af-
firmed. 
JAMES T. HARRISON, C. J., and 
HASWELL, DALY and CASTLES, JJ., 
concur. 
DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN 
Defendant in Pro Se 
P.O. Box 148 
Logan, Utah 84323-0148 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, : 




DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN, : 
Case No. 911000628 
Defendant. : 
COMES NOW, the above-named Defendant, David Craig Carlsen, 
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 22(e) of the Utah.Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, and hereby respectfully moves this Honorable 
Court to correct the illegal sentence or the sentence which was 
imposed in an illegal manner in the above-entitled matter. 
The basis for this motion is that the judgment and sentence 
imposed by the Court in the above-entitled matter for the offense(s) 
of Assault and or Assault upon a Peace Officer were illegal and 
or imposed in an illegal manner for the following reasons: 
1. The jury verdict and the Defendants conviction for the 
offense of Assault upon a Peace Officer was set aside by the Court 
on grounds of insufficient evidence on November 15, 1991. 
2. The Defendant has never been convicted by any Court or 
by any jury of the offense of Simple Assault in violation of 
U.C.A. § 76-5-102, (1953 as amended) and the Defendant was sentenced 
and punished for such offense of which he has not been convicted 
in a Court or by a jury having jurisdiction which violates the 
provisions of U.C.A. § 77-1-4, (1980 Amendment). The offense of 
Assault is not a lesser included offense of the offense of Assault 
upon a Peace Officer because the defenses available to a Defendant 
charged with Assault are different than the defenses available to 
a Defendant charged with Assault upon a Peace Officer as established 
by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568 
(Utah 1991). The Defendant in the instant case was not charged by 
Information for the offense of Assault where he could present to 
a jury the defenses to the offense of Assault and no jury has 
rendered a decision of guilt against the Defendant based upon such 
charge and the defenses available to the Defendant had he been 
charged with such offense. 
3. The Court setting aside the jury verdict on the offense 
of Assault upon a Peace Officer on November 15, 1991 on grounds of 
insufficient evidence constituted an acquittal and the Court was 
barred under the Double Jeopardy Clauses and Due Process Clauses 
under Article I, § 7 and Article I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution 
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and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution from entering a judgment of guilt without trial 
to the offense of Assault and imposing sentence thereon over 
Defendant's objections in Judge's Chambers to such a Motion by 
the Court prior to imposition of sentence. 
4. The written Judgment and Sentence signed by the Court 
does not conform to the sentence verbally imposed by the Court 
on November 15, 1991. 
5. The Court lacked jurisdiction to impose and enter a 
judgment and sentence for the offense of Assault because the 
judgment is not based upon the verdict of the jury and the verdict 
of the jury was responsive to the issues joined by the Information 
and the plea of the Defendant on trial thereto. 
6. The Defendant hereby requests an immediate hearing on 
this Motion to Correct Sentence. 
DATED this 17th day of December, 1993. 
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